During summer 1985, we performed eight cycling experiments on the Data Encryption Standard (DES) to see if DES has certain algebraic weaknesses. Using special-purpose hardware, we applied the cycling ciosure test described in our Eurocrypt 85 paper to determine whether DES is a pure cipher. We also carried out a stronger version of this test,. ( A cipher is pure if, fgr a n y keys i , j , k , there exists some key 1 such that T,T'-'Tk = z, where T, denotes encryption under key w.) In addition, we followed the orbit of a randomly chosen DES transformation for 236 steps, as well as the orbit of t h e composition of two of the "weak key' transformations. Except for the weak key experiment, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that DES acts like a set of randomly chosen permutations. In particular, our results show with overwhelming confidence that DES is not pure. The weak key experiment produced a short cycle of about 233 steps, the consequence of hitting a fixed point for each weak key.
Introduction
At the Eurocrypt 85 conference, we presented experimental statistical evidence that the set of DES transformations is not closed under functional composition \KRS85] ,z During May to August 1985, we performed additional experiments to determine if DES has certain other related algebraic weaknesses. In particular, we addressed the open question, "Is DES a pure cipher?"' In addition, we performed a screngthened version of our closure test and we ran two experiments to investigate the order of DES transformations. Using a combination of software and specialpurpose hardware, we carried out eight experiments, covering five diKerent algebraic tests. Although we experimented only with DES, our tests are general in nature and apply to any to finite, deterministic cryptosysten.
?;one of our experiments involving randomly chosen DES transformations detected ar,y algebraic weaknesses. In particular, oiir data show with extremely high confidence that DES is not pme. However, one experiment inadvertently discovered fixed points for two of the keys, thereby revealing a previously unpublished additional weakness of the weak keys [Dav82] . This abstract is organized in four sections. Section 1 gives an overview of our experiments and explains the purpose of our tests. Section 2 introduces the notation and terminology used throughout the abstract and summarizes previous cycling studies on DES. Section 2 also briefly reviews the cycling closure test and describes our hardware imF1ementation of it. Section 3 lists concise descriptions of our algebraic tests. Finally, section 4 summarizes our findings and explains the two interesting structural properties that we encountered during our tests. An appendix which describes our detailed experimental results is also included.
Overview and Motivation
It is important to know if DES is pure for essentia!ly the same reasons that it is important to know if DES is closed. If DES were pure, then Tuchrnan's multiple encryption scheme would be equivalent to single encryption, and DES would be vulnerable to a known-plaintext attack that runs in 2" steps on the average [KRS85!.' It is possibie that DES is pure, but not closed. (Of course, if DES were closed, then DES would also be pure.) A!though there is no particular reason to suspect that DES is pure, it is unknown in the open literature if DES has this weakness.
The question "Is DES closed?" is a question about the order of the group generated by DES. A related and more detailed question-which we call the small subgroup question-is: "What is the order of the group generated by n given DES transformations?" Any set of DES transformations that generates a small group would suffer the weaknesses of closed ciphers. Specifically, any such set of transformations would be vulnerable to our known-plaintext attack against closed ciphers. In addition, multiple encryption (using either sequential multiple encryption or Tuchman's scheme) involving only transformations from such a set would be equivalent to single encryption from the set.' Finally, when used in output-feedback mode with feedback width 64 [FIS80] , m y transformation from such a set would be at greater risk to produce a key stream with short period.
'The Data Encryption Standard (DES) is a federal standard for the cryptographic protection of computer data, 'See section 2.1 for a review of the de6nition of a pure ciphcr.
4To encrypt a message z under Tuciimnn'3 scheme i to compute T,Tj-iTi(z): where the keys a,i. and k are 5To encrypt a message 2 using sepuextiol muifipie encr3p:ron i3 to compute T,T.(z) , where rhe keys i and i are adopted in November 1'376 by the United Stares Nationai Bureau of Standards [YBS) [FIPS77, DaP84] . Two of our tests address the small subgroup question for n = 1,2.
To test DES for purity and other algebraic weaknesses, we examined the orbits of subsets of DES transformations on particular messages. Our method was to compute the orbits of single DES transformations and to apply our cycling closure test to subsets of two or more DES transformations. To carry out the tests we built special-purpose hardware and implemented a variation of the constant-space cycle-detection algorithm described by Sedgewick and Szymanski [SSY82; . We applied our tests both to randomly chosen transformations and to transformations with special properties (e.g. transformations represented by weak keys). The dominant theme of our tests was to determine if DES has algebraic properties different from those expected from a set of randomly selected permutations.
Since there is an overwhelming chance that even two randomly selected permutations will generate either the alternating group or the symmetric group [BoW77,Dix69], we did not expect to detect any pairs of DES transformations that generate small groups.
Background

Definitions and Notation
The Data Encryption Standard (DES) specifies a mapping T : K x M 4 M, where K = {O,l}sE is the key space and M = {O,l}" is the message space. Each key k E K represents a transformation Tk = T ( k , . ) , which, by the definition of DES, permutes M. DES is endomorphic: its message space and ciphertext space are the same set. It is unknown if DES is fuithful: does every key represent a distinct permutation?
We shall use the following notations throughout the paper. Let M = IMI = P4 be the degree of DES; let K = 1K1 = 2'6 be the size of the key space; and let T = U{Tk : k E K} be the set of all DES transformations. In addition, for any transformation Tk E 7 , let TL1 denote the inverse of Tk.
Let I be the identity permutation on M, and let AN and S,,, be, respectively, the alternating group and symmetric group on M.6 For any permutations g , h we denote the composition of g and h by gh = g 0 h = g[h(.)l. For any permutations g1,g2,. . . ,gnr let (gl,gZ,. . . , gn) denote the group generated by g 1 , g 2 , . . . , gn. Of course, for any R DES transformations Tl, Tz, . . . , T,,, it is true that (TI) 5 (T1,TZ) 2 ( T l , T 2 , .
. . ,Tn) C {T). Since each round of DES is an even permutation, it is also true that ( 7 ) SW, for any z E M , the G-orbit of z is the set G-orbit(z) = {g(z) : g E C}. For any permutation g E Sa, may write g-orbit(z) to denote the (g)-orbit of z. I f f is any function (not necessarily a permutation) and if z E Dornain(f), we define the f-closure of z to be the set f-closure(z) = { f ( z ) : a 2 O}. For any subgroup G C SW, the order of G is the number of elements in G . For any g E S f i , the order ofg is the order of (9 
2.3
The cycling closure test is a statistical test that explores one aspect of the algebraic structure of any b i t e , deterministic cryptosystem. It works by taking a pseudo-random walk in the message space for a specified number of steps or until a cycle is detected. For each step of the pseude random walk, the previous ciphertext is encrypted under a key chosen by a pseudwandom function of the previous ciphertext. Results of the test are asymmetrical: long walks are overwhelming evidence that the set of permutations is not a group; short walks axe strong evidence that the set of permutations has a structure different from that expected from a set of randomly The cycling closure test collects evidence which can be used to compute a measure of our relative degree of belief in the following two competing hypotheses: Hc = "DES is a group." HR = "Each DES transformation was chosen independently with uniform probability from the symmetric group on M."
Let E be the evidence that a trial of the cycling closure test ran for r steps without detecting a cycle. As explained in [KRS85], this evidence can be interpreted by computing the conditional probabilities p~ = P ( E 1 H e ) and P R = P ( E I H R ) , where pc ~g e-rZ/ZK and PR e-ra/zM.
(1)
In light of the evidence E, a Bayesian would update her initial odds in favor of HG over HR by a factor of p c I p~.
Special-Purpose Hardware
We carried out each experiment using special-purpose hardware which we had originally built to test DES for closure. The main feature of our hardware is that it can compute a sequence of 2" DES encryptions per day, where at each step the previous ciphertext is encrypted under a key that depends on the previous ciphertext. Our hardware consists of a custom wire-wrap board that plugs into an IBM personal computer. The board contains one AMD 28068 DES chip and a 7.1 MHz finite state controller. By modifying the microcode of the board's finitestate controller, we adapted the board to carry out each of the five algebraic tests. (See [KRS85] for a more detailed description of our special-purpose hardware.')
Cycling Experiments on DES
This section briefly describes the four additional cycling tests that we performed on DES. We call these tests the purity test, orbit test, small subgroup test, closure test, and eztended message space closure test. A sixth reduced message space test is also described.
Purity Test
Pick any transformation To E T and apply the cycling closure test to the set TG'T. 
Orbit Test
Given any key k and any message 20, compute zi = T ; ( z o ) , i = 1,2,. . . for a specified number of steps or until a cycle i s detected.
The period of this sequence is the length of Tk-orbit(zo). In other words, if we consider the permutation Tk as a product of disjoint cycles, then the period of the sequence is simply the 'Schematic diagrams of our hardware will be included in a revised version of this paper, to be available from the authors same time in the future. length of the cycle that contains 20. If this test is run for r steps without detecting a cycle, then r is a lower bound on order(Tb) and hence on order({T)).
For a randomly chosen permutation on M , for each 1 5 I 5 M , the probability that zo lies in a cycle of length exactly I is 1/M [HarSS,PuW68] (iKnu691, exercise 3.1.12). Hence, the expected cycle-length of the longest cycle of a randomly chosen permutation on n letters is about 0.624n
[ShL66] (for DES, this is about 263). For a randomly chosen permutation on M, the chance that we fall into a cycle of length 236 or less is about 2-(63-36) = 2-*'.
Although we do not do so in this preliminary abstract, it is possijle to interpret results of the orbit test to obtain statistical lower bounds on the order of the group generated by DES. Such analysis depends on the structure of the group. For example, the orbit test behaves differently on cyclic groups than on symmetric groups. Consequently, it is useful to combine the orbit test with other algebraic tests, including tests for faithfulness, commutativity, solvability at various levels, and nilpotence at various classes.
Small Subgroup Test
Given two distinct keys i , j E K and any message zo, apply the cycling closure test to the set {T,,T,} to obtain a statistical lower bound on the length of the (T,,Tj)-orbit of ZO.
In the orbit and small group tests, it would be interesting to examine both randomly chosen transformations and certain "special" transformations. For example, it would be interesting to explore weak keys, semi-weak keys, light keys (keys with a low density of ones), heavy keys (keys with a high density of ones), and pairs of related keys (e.g. keys that differ in one bit and keys that are complements of each other).
3.4
For any experiment that uses the cycling closure test, perform the cycling closure test with an extended message space space that consists of the Cartesian product M' of the original message space, for some small integer 1.' ' The closure test works by computing a statistical lower bound on the length of ( 7 ) -orbit(zo), which, in turn, yields a lower bound on the order of ( 7 ) . Limits on the lower bounds achievable by this test are imposed both by the number of steps the test is carried out and by the relative sizes of the message space and key space. For all 1 5 r 5 m, if the test is run for r steps without detecting a cycle, then with high probability order( (T)) 2 r2. To use the cycling closure test to obtain statistical lower bounds on order(( 7 ) ) greater than 264, it is necessary to perform an extended message test with I > 1.
Extended Message Space Closure Tests
Reduced Message Space Tests
Perform each of the above tests on a modified version of DES in which the message space is reduced in size. Specifically, consider DES-derived functions di : M , -+ M , on the reduced message space M, = {O,l}r, where r is some small integer (say, r = 8) and & is defined as follows. For each key k E K , define 4 k by 4~ = KZTkKl, where ~1 : M, + M is an injection and TTZ : M 4 M, is a projection. (For example, x1 might fix the first 56 DES input bits to 0, and a2 might take only the last 8 DES output bits.)
'"In the extended message space closure test, the pseudo-random function p maps M 1 in60 K . and "Each DES transformation was drawn at random from the symmetric group on M" respectively.)
Studying reduced message space versions of DES is useful for two reasons. First, it is one way to look for structures that may be present on subsets of the message space. Second, by sufficiently restricting the message space, it is possible to write down a complete description of the action of particular transformations on the reduced message space.
Experimental Results and Conclusions
This section summarizes our experimental results and discusses two interesting structural findings.
Summary of Experimental Results
During May to August 1985, we performed eight cycling experiments covering five different algebraic tests. Specifically, we performed three closure tests, one extended message space closure test, two purity tests, one small subgroup test using two of the weak keys, and one orbit test." These experiments gathered overwhelming statistical evidence that DES is neither pure nor closed and that the size of the group generated by DES is at least Zm. As one test of correctness, we ran a software implementation of the cycling closure test for 30,000 steps. The software and hardware implementations agreed on all values. As a second test of correctness, we repeated experiments 1 and 2 and obtained identical results. We invite the interested reader to verify our results using the detailed experimental data found in appendix A.
In experiment 7, we applied the small subgroup test to the transformations represented by the two weak keys that consist respectively of all zeros and all ones. Since each of the weak transformations is self inverse, we implemented this test as an orbit test using the composition of the weak transformations. This experiment produced a short cycle of about Z3' steps, which would be unusual (probability less than lo-') if the tested permutation were chosen at random from Sx.
"We also performed one trial of a reduced message space closure test that detected no algebraic weaknesses. 
Two Structural Findings
Although moat of our experimental results are consistent with the hypothesis that DES acts like a set of randomly chosen permutations, three experiments did yield interesting regularities. One regularity is a result of the well-known complementation property;" the other involves a newly discovered property of the weak keys. We will now explain these structural findings.
Complementation and Drainage Properties
In the first two experiments, we performed two independent trials of the cycling closure test.
Each of theae experiments used the 'identity" next key function-the function p: M -+ K that removes each of the eight parity bits. These two experiments produced two interesting findings. First, each of the pseud-random walks drained into the same cycle. Second, each point on the cycle was the bitwise complement of the corresponding point exactly halfway around the cycle. Figure 1 illustrates these findings.
The first finding is explained by the fact that, for the graph of a randomly chosen function, most points on the graph will probably drain into the same cycle. See [HeR82] for one analysis of this phenomenon.
The second finding is a consequence of DES's complementation property and the fact thatthe identity next key function also has a complementation property (for all messages z, p ( Z ) = ~( z ) ) .
The cycling closure test computes a pseudo-random walk zo, zl,. . ., where z,+~ = T p ( z , ) ( z , ) , for i 2 1. If z, = Z; for any i > j, then it would follow that =s+1 = T P ( * , ) ( Z * ) = T P ( f ; ) ( z ; ) = Tm(q) = 7-t(=,1(4 = Gi. Therefore, by induction, z , +~ = 21+h for all h 2 0. This situation arises whenever some Z, = 2; before any 5, = z, with i > 1 , which will happen for about half of all initial messages. 
4.2.2
In experiment 7, we computed the orbit of a message under the composition of the two weak keys that consist respectively of all zero8 and all ones. Although each weak key is self-inverse, we did not expect the composition t o produce short orbits. Much to o w surprise, we detected a cycle of length less than 2=. We presented this finding at the Crypto 85 conference and sought a simple explanation.
After some thought, Don Coppersmith suggested that we had encountered fixed points of the weak keys, i.e., messages z for which Tl...l(z) = z or To ~( z ) = z. Since each weak key yields 16 identical round keys, for each weak key, a fixed point results whenever DES's L and R registers agree after eight rounds. Since the middle L and R registers are equal with probability about 1/2", there should be about 2" fixed points for each of the four weak keys. Hence, by 2" steps, it wa3 likely that we had encountered a fixed point. Figure 2 illustrates the effeet of the fixed points on the walk in the message space and explains why a cycle resulted. After the conference, we found the fixed points and thus confirmed Coppersmith's hypothesis (see appendix). To the best of our knowledge, these fixed pointa are the first published in the open literature. These fixed points further illustrate the deficiencies of the weak keys.
Coppersmith also suggested that the algebraic strmture detected in experiment 7 can be used to prove strong lower bounds on the size of the group generated by DES. 
A.1 Notation
In the body of the abstract, we defined the key space of DES to be the set K = (0, l}56. Most DES implementations, however, nominally treat each key as a string of 64 bits, where every eighth key bit is a parity bit which is ignored. In this appendix, we too shall specify keys and messages as %bit string!, described in hexadecimal notation. To do this, it is coFvenient to introduce the DES function T: K x M -+ M that operates on the nominal key space K = (0, l}64.
A.2 Next K e y Functions
The cycling closure test depends on a function p: M + K to compute the next key from the current message. We will now describe the two particular nezt k e y functions that we used duri:g our experiments. We will define each next key function in terms of its related function 3: M + K.
Each next key function operated in a byteby-byte fashion using a byte substitution table In experiments 1 and 2, we chose S to be the identity function. In the other cycling closure experiments, we used the byte substitution table given by table 2.'' This table was designed SO that each entry has odd parity and such that each entry appears exactly twice. The table was generated using the random number generator in the C library on our IBM PC.
For the experiments that used the extended message space M2, we computed j(z)(') = S(z(*')) using the substitution table given in table 2.
A.3 Selection of Experimental Parameters
We chose initial messages and keys in a variety of nd hoe ways. Some we selected in an obviously deterministic manner (e.g., 20 = 0123456789ABCDEF). Others are related to the authors' social security numbers or other personal data. The rest we generated using DES and MACSYMA. 
A.4 Detailed Experimental Results
